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BANKS IN THE MARKET FOR LIQUIDITy
ABSTRACT
Banks are unique among financialinstitutionsbecausethey are the
cheapest source of liquidity in theeconomy.Banks choose to holdreserves
to facilitate settlement of end-of-daynet due to positions arising from
payments operations.Money market substitutes for bankliabilities do not
escape from the cost of reserves since theirissuers lean on banks to
provide liquidity.Since the cost of reserves fallson all issuers of less
liquid liabilities seekingaccess to payment services, including non-bank
intermediaries, reserves cannotrepresent a tax on the banking system alone.
Peter Carber Steven Weisbrod
Department of Economics Weisbrod Group Ltd.
Brown University 114 E.32 Street
Providence, RI 02912 Suite 1306
New York, NY 10016Inrecentliterature on the roleof banksinfinancial
markets, the ascendent perspectivehas focused on banks'special
information about borrowersrelative to that of otherfinancial
institutions)-For example, Fania (1985)presented evidence that
commercial, paper, bankers'acceptances, and bankcertificates of
deposit trade at thesame yields.Banks must holdreserves against
deposits, which mostresearchers interpretas a tax paid by bank
customers.2 Because commercialpaper does not haveareserve
requirement, Fama inferredthat depositors do notpay for reserves.
He concluded that the tax incidencefalls on customers whoborrow
from banks and that thereforebank loans are a uniqueform of
credit.Otherwise, borrowers wouldswitch to an untaxedsource of
credit.
Such observations havegenerated assumptions that bankshave
private information aboutcustomers unavailable to other,non—bank
lenders.Little effort has beenexpended, however, to detailthe
1For arecent review of this literatureandofother perspectives on the role of banks,see Gertler (1987).
2For example, see Black (1975)for such an interpretation.
James (1987) confirms Fania'sevidences on insignificantspreads between certificates of depositand commercial paper, showingthat the average spread remainedunchanged across changes inreserve requirements.
James (1987) developed additionalevidence that capital markets regard banksas possessors of private informationabout borrowers not availableto other lenders.He found that the announcement of a bank line ofcredit causes the stock of the
recipient company to exhibitexcess returns immediately after the announcement.In contrast, he found thatthe announcement of a commitment to lend byan insurance company causesno such reaction in the stock market. Lummer and Mcconnell(1989)found that James's results hold onlywhen existing bank linesare renewed.
2sources of such superior bank information.4
In these pages, we consider an explanation of why banks are
unique among financial intermediaries which does not lean onan
informational advantage.Banks are unique because they are the
cheapest source of liquidity in the economy.This advantage is not
derived from the special nature of individual banks but from the
special nature of the banking system which can mobilize good funds
more easily than competing financial institutions.5When a cash
in advance requirement materializes for some transaction,a bank
must make the market by delivering a bank deposit.
We develop this liquidity concept by presenting a basic image
of the commercial paper market in which issuers may be forced to
depend on bank loans to guarantee delivery of cash to investors
when their paper matures.Issuers in such wholesale markets obtain
Black (1975) and Goodfriend (1988) have suggested that
banks obtain their special information because of their role in the
payments system.They argue that a bank benefits from having a
demand deposit relationship with a customer which provides it with
current information about the state of the borrower's financial
condition.Another non—bank lender, however, could easily erode
this competitive advantage by requesting that the borrower provide
real time access to his on line bank financial statements.
Goodfriend also argues that since banks must lend to each
other onshort notice,they develop skillsfor quick credit
evaluation. Theseskillsarethen transferabletocustomer
examination.
There may be economies for a potential borrower to subject
itself to a bank credit examination because the borrower must visit
the bank anyway to access the payment system.After having done
the examination, the bank knows more than other lendersex cost;
but ex ante it has no intrinsic advantage in information gathering.
"Good funds" can mean either cash or, more typically in the
wholesale markets we examine, deposits at the Federal Reserveor at
banks,items whose delivery always constitutes settlement ofa
claim for dollars.
3assurance of access to bank loans by establishinga line of credit
with a bank.If the line is used, the bank must issuea demand
deposit and obtain reserves.To guarantee thatit will have
reserves, the bank holds reserves against theunused line,tinder
this scenario, participants in thecommercial paper market bear
part of the cost of the bank'sreserves, the price paid for making
commercial paper liquid.In a more realistic commercialpaper
market where reserves are not held directlyagainst an unused line,
anyone demanding liquidity for commercialpaper will still pay for
the cost of reserves in the bankingsystem.We extend our argument
further across the balance sheets of banksby explaining how banks
can hold commercial and industrial loans inthe absence of an
informational advantage.
Analogoustotherelationbetweencommercialpaperand
certificates of deposit, demand depositsand Federal funds loans
are substitutes.Holders of neither instrument bears thecost of
reserve requirements against demand deposits.Rather, holders and
issuers of less liquid assets requiringperiodic settlement in
demand deposits bear the costs.Any wholesale borrower or lender
demanding liquidity is directlyor indirectly a potential bank
customer acquiring similar services fromthe bank.The standard
explanation treats borrowers and depositorsat banks as different
groups making essentially different decisions.
Finally, we study the sense in whichreserves can possibly be
a tax on the banking system rather thana cost of accessing payment
services paid by less liquid securitiesmarkets,Generally, it is
4difficult to determine the incidence of any tax because the entity
directly paying the tax typically passes the cost throughto its
customers.Bank customers dealing in the wholesale money markets
considered here channel their direct costs of bank servicesto
their ultimate clients, the issuers and buyers of securities less
liquid than bank deposits.
Indeed, since reserves provide a service, reserve requirements
are not necessarily a tax. Reserves cover the costs and risks
assumed by the clearing mechanism, generally a central bank. If
reserve requirements exceed those needed to cover the risk of the
central bank, however,reserves do represent a tax; but the costs
will be borne by all users of liquidity. If there are non-
reservable perfect substitutes for each class of bank deposits,
reserve requirements cannot be excessive; banks will adjust their
reservable deposits to match their desired reserve holdings.
1. Who Pays for Reserve Requirements?
We begin this analysis with the now conventional scenario of
who pays for reserve requirements.In Figure 1, the vertical axis
represents the interest rate paid on bank depositsor earned on
loans by banks,holding otherinterest ratesintheeconomy
constant. Thesupplyofdepositstothe bankingsystemis
perfectlyelastic atinterestrater. The costofreserve
requirements, the foregone interest on reserve holdings at the
central bank, is represented in Figure 1 by the difference between
the dashed line and the supply curve of deposits.The demand for
5bank loans is downward sloping.
Theshapeofthesupply curveofdepositsinFigure 1
indicates that investors' portfolios contain perfect substitutes
for bank deposits.Investors are unwilling to earn a lower yield
on bank deposits than on the perfect substitute, which is exempt
from reserve requirements.As a result, depositors will notbear
the cost of reserves.
Non—bank loans are riot perfect substitutes for bank loans.If
the interest rate on bank loans rises relative to rateson other
credit market instruments, bank borrowers will continue to demand
bank loans, though in reduced amounts.Borrowers then bear the
cost of reserves in Figure 1.
Are There Perfect Substitutes for Bank Deposits?
Commercial paper offers an alternative short—term investment
to bank certificates of deposit.Like a bank deposit, it promises
to deliver good funds at maturity; but since commercial paper is
not a bank liability,it does not have a reserve requirement.
Commercial paper issued by creditworthy corporations in the United
States trades at the same yield on average as bank CD.6Bank CD,
like commercial paper,is negotiable, so both instruments can be
sold to other parties before maturity.Alternatively, both can be
used as collateral to obtain bank loans.
That commercial paper and certificates of deposits trade at
the same yields indicates that they have the same liquidity and
risk characteristics.From this evidence of substitutability and
6This was shown in Fama's (1985), Table 1.
6the graphical analysis of Figure 1, we should infer that the cost
of reserves is paid by bank borrowers and not by bank depositors.
From this conclusion arises the assumption that banksare special
because they have access to special information about borrowers
that cannot be equally well gathered by a non—bank lender.
Commercial Paper Issuers Obtain Credit Lines from Banks
This reasoning, however, ignores an important element in the
commercial paper market: corporations which issue commercialpaper
maintain credit lines, representing the right to borrow goodfunds
fromabankduringacertainperiod.7 Creditlinesgive
commercial paper issuers access to the liquidity of the banking
system.Commercial paper issuers sometimes require bank loans to
pay off their commercialpaper;as occasional bank borrowers
themselves,they must also pay for reserves according tothe
conventional view that bank borrowers pay forreserves.
2. Banks as Market Makers in Liquidity
Accesstogoodfundsmakesbankssuppliersofcashto
commercial paper issuers.Since any financial institution can hold
We have been purposeful in maintaining this oversightto
mimic the analysis of the current bankingliterature.Fama (1985)
discusses lines of credit but onlyas a device for periodically
triggering a bank's assessment of thecompany.In practice, banks
do not generally back up their creditassessment with a guaranteed
loan, however; the line is conditionalon no material change in the
financialstandingofthe company.Hence,the bank makinga
commitment of a line needs to knowno more about its customer than
other financial intermediaries know.
7good funds in the form of a currency inventory, it isuseful to
explore the organization of the banking system to understandwhy
banks are the lowest cost market maker in good funds.
Banks hold a small percentage of their assets in goodfunds.
Individual banks can make a credible statement aboutdelivering
good funds to their deposit customers and borrowerson demand
because banks are part of a banking system, tied togetherby the
clearing and settlement mechanism of a clearinghouse.Members
agree to lend good funds to members who experience a drainon good
funds on any particular day,i.e.to banks whose market making
activities in good funds cause them to have end of day net debit
positions from large volumes of payment orders.8
A Clearinghouse System
We now examine the organization of a clearinghouse and the
effectsofdifferent conventionsofclearingandsettlement.
Though most of the following is well—known,it emphasizes the
advantage that a clearing and settlement system gives to banks in
the market for good funds.
Payments with Continuous Settlement
Final settlement of payments among banks occurs with the
delivery of good funds.9In a system of continuous settlement,
8Whenever a deposit is cashed or a loan is made,a bank
becomes a buyer of good funds at a posted bid price because it must
make delivery of funds to a customer or another bank.Whenever a
loan is repaid or a deposit is made,a bank becomes a seller of
good funds at a posted offer price.
Of course, settlement may be in any mutually acceptible
medium.In actual banking systems, settlement is not final unless
payment is made in good funds——currency or central bank deposits.
8each payment message from one bank to another is accompanied by the
good funds specified in the message.As long as the sending bank
hassufficientreservesonhand,paymentsmessageswillbe
processed without delay. In continuous settlements,receiving
banksbearnocreditriskfrom participatinginthepayment
mechanism.
In a continuous settlement system, when the amount of payment
exceeds the good funds on hand, the payment must be blocked until
morefundsarereceived. Ifnumerous banksfaceasimilar
situation, the payments system can become gridlocked.Banks wish
to make large payments to each other but cannot send payments
because they have not received payments. Thus,asystem of
continuous settlement dispels credit risk among banks from the
day's payments by reducing the potential speed of transmitting
payments.That is,it reduces risk by reducing liquidity.
The gridlock problem can be solved by breaking up payment
orders into smaller parts.This increases the payment traffic on
the communication system and may result in incomplete delivery of
agreed values, thereby creating credit risk.Alternatively, the
banks can generally increase their reserve holdings.This would
involve selling loans to other investors in return for good funds.
Bank customers would havetopass throughahigher costof
reserves.
Whether this arises through legal constraints or through choice is
not at issue here.
9Periodic Net Settlement
To avoid breaking up transactions or increasing reserves,
banks can engage in net settlement at the end of the day.They
would pay the difference between total payments and total receipts
at the end of the day, forming a clearinghouse for the purpose of
executing the net settlement.All good funds held by banks would
be transferred to the clearinghouse to collateralize bank payment
orders.
Banks can execute delivery of good funds without increasing
their reserves because the individual members of the clearinghouse
and their customers believe that net due to positions cumulating
during the day will be covered by delivery of goodfunds at
settlement. Membersarejustifiedintheirbeliefifthe
clearinghouse guarantees due to's and holds reserves exceeding the
sum of the net due to exposures to the clearinghouse that crop up
between settlement periods.
In a private clearinghouse system reserves are not atax;
rather, they are the cost of providing assurance that good funds
will be delivered to banks for their net due to positions. The
clearinghousedoesnotinsurethatallthedepositsinan
individual bank will be treated as cash settlement by the market
place, but it does guarantee that good funds will be delivered for
payment orders among banks)0To the extent that the guarantee
10In settling net positions, the clearinghouse makes a claim
that in the event that one member is in bankruptcy,it has the
right to offset payments due from that member with payments due to
that member.The clearinghouse makes prior claim over all other
creditors to the bankrupt member's liabilities to the clearinghouse
10is credible,a depositor can treat bank payment orders toits
account during the day as good funds.
The Role of the Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserveisa clearinghouse with the power to
create good funds by purchasing government or private securities.
The Fed's power freely to create reserves does not obviate reserves
as a source of liquidity.Nor does this power make reserves a tax,
as in the conventional interpretation. The Fed bears the same risk
of settlement failure as the private clearinghouse: reserves serve
as a guarantee to the Fed of the delivery of good funds against
end-of-day net due to positions.
In Fedwire payments,banks with net positions due their
reserve account at settlement borrow Fed funds from other members.
The Federal Reserve guarantees unconditionally that a bank payment
messagesentover Fedwire willbehonoredasgoodfundsat
settlement. Ifabank fails to deliver good funds,the Fed
supplies them without assessing other banks for the deficit in
reserves resulting from the failure.During the day, the Fed then
insures the market in wholesale payments.Hence, the revenue on
reserves deposited with the Fed serves as a compensation for the
to the extent that they are offset by that member's loans to the
clearinghouse.Much of the security the clearinghouse adds to the
payments mechanismis derivedfrom liability rules. Reserve
requirements protect the payments mechanism in a similar fashion.
They are assets of the several member banks, but the clearinghouse
has prior claim to them in the event of bankruptcy.
11risk it bears.3-1
The inter—connection among banks and their connectionto the
central bank permits the quick movement of good funds frombanks
with a surplus of good funds to deficit banks.Of course, non-bank
institutions could establish similar networks andsupply similar
assets and liabilities, but this would effectively make thembanks,
though lacking in payment insurance.That banks can turn to the
central bank for funds, however, makes it certain that theirnet
due to's issued between settlement periods will be settled ingood
funds, while the net due to's of other financial institutionslack
such guarantees.
Aside from operational expense, the cost to the banks ofthe
liquidity provided to borrowers and depositors throughaccess to
the banking system is the forgone intereston the reserves banks
hold with the central bank to guarantee liquidity.Other financial
institutions are not required by regulators to bear this cost, and
they typically do not form independent organizations which impose
reserve requirements on members.12If banks alone are forced to
The Fed may or may not earn a profit from the user charge
represented by reserves, depending on its magnitude.Moreover,
there may be more efficient means of chargingfor thisrisk
bearing. SincetheTreasurytaxestheFed'srevenues,it
ultimately bears the risk of operating the payment system.
12In the U.S.,any depository institution which offers
transaction accounts, that is, deposits which permit third party
payments services, must hold reserves with the Federal Reserve.
The role of non—banks in wholesale payments isvery small, however.
Clearinghouses in organized financial markets provide liquidity
servicesformembersanddoregulatememberliquidity,but
ultimately they rely on the banking system for the delivery of good
funds to cover net positions.
12hold reserves and membership in a central banking system has no
offsetting value,banks would gooutofbusiness becauseno
investor or borrower would be willing to pay for the reserves. The
banking system gives banks the advantage of providing to potential
borrowers a credible guarantee of delivery of good funds without
holding reserves on their balance sheets to cover all lines.
3. Pricing a Line of Credit: A Basic View
Commercial paper issuers attachaline because they must
assure lenders that they can deliver good fundsat maturity.
Normally, issuers can obtain funds by reissuing or rolling over
commercial paper;during times of liquidity stress in the money
markets, however, it is difficult for even high quality borrows to
issue short—term paper.Even in normal times, a CP issuer may face
technical problems in rolling over its paper.A cash delivery can
be assured only by buying a line from a bank which in turn has
access to the banking system and to the liquidity services of the
central bank.
We will see that commercial paper holders must bear some of
the issuer's cost of accessing bank liquidity and that the cost of
using a line is related to the cost of reserve requirements.To
analyze these claims, we examine the banking transactions involved
with maturing CD and CP.
A Certificate of Deposit Matures
In Table 1 we illustrate the impact of a maturing deposit on
the balance sheet of a banking system consisting of two banks.
13Consider banks A and B in Table la.As assets, bank A has $900 of
loans onthe asset side and $100 of reserves.It funds these
assets with a$100 certificate of deposit and $900 of demand
deposits. Suppose that banks by convention hold10percent
reserves against demand deposits but can choose any levelof
reservesagainst CD,so bank A holds "excess reserves" of $10
which, as we will see, guaranteesthe liquidity of the CD.Bank B
has loans of $540, reserves of $60 and $600 of demand deposits.
Now let us assume that the CD on Bank A's balance sheet
matures.The holder of that deposit uses the funds to pay a debt
to a customer of bank B, who, in turn, buys a demand deposit (DD)
from bank B with the funds.The customers of the banking system as
a whole then do not roll over the CD but require settlement in
demand deposits.If they are always willing to roll over the CD,
the existence of CD would place no liquidity demands on the system.
Occasional demands to settle CD in demand deposits make CD somewhat
illiquid.
If the system settles at end—of—day, in the first instant the
payment order appears on B's books as a due from A of $100 and an
addition to demand deposits of $100.On the other hand, if this is
aprivate continuous settlement system,A would send $100in
reserves.
Bank A still has $900 of loans which it funds with $900 in
demand deposits. It settles its payment with the delivery of $100
in reserves to bank B, so its reserves were sufficient to cover its
end-of-day net due to position.Bank A may feel that its position
14is not balanced because it may not have sufficient reserves to
process further payments next day.Suppose that A considers $90 in
reserves sufficient to operate its payment services. In the inter-
bank market, bank A borrows $90 from B so that B now has a due from
A on the asset side of its balance sheet, and A has a due to B on
the liability side of its balance sheet.The final positions of
banks A and B are illustrated in Table lb.The CD was liquid
because bank A could guarantee the delivery of good funds through
its reserve holdings and its ready access to interbank loans.
Reserves on hand also guaranteed liquidity by effecting a transfer
among banks of the credit risk arising from the day's payments
traffic
Commercial Paper Matures
Suppose now that the investor who held a CD in bank A in the
previous example holds commercial paper instead.The holder of the
CP is a customer of bank B.Since commercial paper is the direct
liability of a borrower, both loans and CD are initially $100 less
than in the previous example.The issuer of CP, however, arranges
a line of credit from bank A to assure payment at maturity.
The initial positions of banks A and B are presented in Table
2a.Bank A has a credit line for $100 to the commercial paper
issuer.Appearing as a memo item, this line represents a potential
liability because bank A must raise a liability if the line is
used.
Suppose that the CP issuer cannot roll over the paper when the
15CP matures.The issuer of the CP, calling on his line,takes a
loan from bank A to pay the customer of bank B.The customer of
bank B again buys a DD from his bank with the funds.The balance
sheets of the two banks up to this point are illustrated inTable
2b.Bank A's assets consist of its original $800 in loans plus its
new $100 loan to the CP issuer.Bank B's DD liabilities have
increased by $100.The accounts of the two banks are balanced
through the use of due to's and due from's if settlement is at end
of day.If settlement is continuous, balancing occurs througha
delivery of reserves.With a clearinghouse or with a central bank
bearing payment system risk,bank A will have to restoreits
reserve position to cover the risk to the payment system on the
next day's transactions.Bank A borrows $90in the interbank
market to leave the end—of—day position of the banking system as in
2c. Asaneffectofthesetransactions,bankassetsand
liabilities have been substitutedfor the maturing commercial
paper.
Holding Reserves Against a Line
Again, raising the DD in bank B generates a use of reserves
forsettlementdirectlyconnectedtoprovidingliquidityto
commercial paper.Bank B cannot expand its demand deposits carried
overnight without increasing its reserves by $10 because it must
cover its greater potential next day net due to position.Bank A
can satisfy its commitment to the CP issuer by holding sufficient
good funds as reserves on its balance sheet to cover the increased
reserve holdings on the DD generated when the issue matures.Bank
16A knows that the delivery of $10 in good funds plus $90 of due to's
will satisfy its credit commitment to the CP issuer, while still
allowing it to serve the potential next day payment needs of its
remaining DD customers.13More generally, bank A need not hold
the additional reserves directly, as long as they are available
somewhere in the banking system.
The Price of the Line of Credit and the Cost of Holding Reserves
In this example, the reserves held against the CP and CD are
equivalent.If bank A holds $10 in additional reserves to cover
its liquidity commitment on its customer's line, the opportunity
cost will be covered in the price of the line on the commercial
paper.The CP issuer will offer a commensurably lower yield to
cover this cost of providing liquidity, so the CP holder bears the
cost of reserves neededinthe payments mechanism to provide
liquidity. Both short-term and liquid,CP and CD are perfect
substitutes; and they should therefore pay the same yields,as
confirmed by Fama.Both depend on the holding of good funds as
reserves against demand deposits to assure liquidity, however, so
both pay for the cost of such reserves.
This stark example is not a realistic view of the CP market,
however.As members of a banking system,individual banks can
provide lines without actually holding reserves. They can provide
liquidity to non—bank securities at a much lower cost than our
13If settlement in bank claims alone were sufficient to
operate the payment system, there would be no need for reserves.
Reserve holdings even in a private clearing system provide the most
liquid collateral for participants.
17example would imply.We will show below that the effect ofa
banking system's ability to economize on reserve holdings does not
change the incidence of the cost of reserves.
4. The Cost of Liquidity: A More Realistic Commercial Paper Market
In our simple commercial paper example, we concluded that both
CP and CD holders pay for reserves.We consider again a commercial
paper marketin which issuers hold bank lines to assurethe
delivery of good funds to investors at maturity.If the line is
used, a loan is created to deliver funds to the CP holder's bank.
The issuance of the loan creates a due to position to the CP
holder's bank which must be funded with a deposit. Since the
Federal Reserve guarantees that the due to will be converted to
good funds at settlement, reserves need not be held against the
line to guarantee that a deposit can be created to fund the loan.
If the deposit is issued, reserves must be found by the end of the
day, however.We will discuss in detail how the costs of reserves
are split. First, we determine the costs borne by the CP buyer.
Then we consider costs borne by the CP issuer.
The CP Buyer's Cost of Bank Liquidity
Suppose that the commercial paper issuer faces a probability
of .1 of borrowing from a bank at the maturity of the CP in five
business days.The CP issuer expects to use a bank loan only
overnight at maturity, if at all.As an alternative to issuing CP
18with a line, he can issue a liability of the same maturity without
a liquidity guarantee.He would issue the less liquid liability if
he could sell it at an interest expense greater than the explicit
interest expense on the CP by no more than the expected additional
cost of the bank loan plus the up—front cost of the line.
Assume that the interest rate in the inter—bank Fed funds
market is 10 percent and the reserve ratio against demand deposits
is 10 percent.Since the bank can sell reserves in the Fed funds
market,its opportunity cost of reserves is an annualized one
percent of the deposits that it must raise to fund its loans.
The CP issuer's expected annualized cost of reserves is 1/5 x
1/10 x 1 percent or 2 basis points.The issuer faces a ten percent
probability of using a bank loan once every five days.He will
issue commercial paper backed by a credit line rather than a less
liquid liability if he can obtain at leastatwo basis point
reduction in his annual interest rate for doing so.The CP buyer
in this case will accept a two basis point reduction from the yield
on less liquid paper, such as the same paper without a bank line.
The CD Buyer's Cost of Bank Liquidity
To determine the cost of reserves to the CD holder, we must
consider whether CD can substitute for CP in an illiquid market in
which CP generally cannot be rolled over.Actually having the same
liquidity characteristics indicates that the two instruments are
affected similarly when the market demands delivery of cash.If
the delivery of a CD is accepted as settlement when the delivery of
19CP generally is not accepted, CD must be more liquid than CPand
therefore must trade at a lower yield.
Accepting the evidence indicating that CD and CP are equally
liquid, we presume in completing this example the extremecase that
investors reluctant to hold CP also shun CD.14In this case,a
demand for cash payment requires settlement with a demand deposit,
which always maintains its value in good funds.If holders of both
CP and CD require delivery of a demand deposit in a liquidity
crunch, they must both pay for the reserve holdings against demand
deposits when either the bank issuing CD or the corporation issuing
CP cannot roll over these liabilities.In this case, holders of
bothinstruments payfor theexpectation that investors will
require ademanddeposit at settlement, and their yields are less
than the yield of a less liquid instrument by the expected cost of
holding reserves on demand deposits.
The CP Issuer's Cost of Bank Liquidity: The Role of the Dealer
The analysis of the incidence of reserve costs is not yet
complete because the holder of CP or CD may wish to sell the
security before maturity.Assume that the investor sells to a
dealer who in circumstances of illiquidity in CP and CD markets
cannot sell the security under a repurchase agreement to finance
inventory.The dealer must then finance with a bank loan which, iii
turn, must be financed by the issue of a demand deposit, given that
14More generally, the CP of an individual firm may not roll
over even though there is no general OP crisis.The bank loan may
then be funded with CD.
20the CP and CD markets are not then liquid.
Since the CP or CD has not matured,it must be sold ata
discount today.The discount must be greater than normal by the
cost of the reserves, which represents an additional funding cost
for the dealer.15We assume again that interest rate on Fed
funds is 10 percent and that the reserve ratio against DD is 10
percent, so the cost of reserves will be an annualized 1 percent of
demanddeposit funding.
As before, we assume that with a probability of .1, the CP or
CD cannot be sold before maturity without bank funding to the
dealer and that five days remain until maturity.On issue, the
investor must be compensatedfortheexpected extracostof
illiquidityinthe CP and CD markets,i.e.the extra haircut
administered by the dealer to cover the reserve cost of his bank
loan.We assume an equal probability that the paper cannot be sold
on any of the four days before maturity.On an annualized basis,
the expected cost of liquidity of a sale before maturity is 4/5 x
1/10 x 1 percent, or 8 basis points.The investor is then paid 8
basis points above the rate of return on Fed funds.16
15This analysis presumes that there is an ample number of
dealers with well—prepared bank lines.If not, there is an even
greater illiquidity due to the limited capacity ofindividual
dealers to bear risk.See Grossman and Miller(1989)on this
issue.
16It is not necessary for all investors to sell their CP and
CD for demand deposits in a liquidity crunch.As in all markets,
the demands of the marginal investor determine the price.The
eight basis points is the incremental return required to make the
marginal investor willing to bear the risk of a decline in the
value of his security relative to good funds in a crunch, whether
he sells his security or not.
21The liquidity crunch requiring the raising of a demanddeposit
occurs with probability .1 spread evenly over the time to maturity
of the paper.The total expected cost of reserves generated by
loans providing liquidity to CP is then ten basis points(1/10 x 1
percent).If the CP buyer were to pay this expected cost entirely,
the issuer would have to compensate him by offeringa yield 10
basis points above Fed funds.The issuer, however, achieves a2
basis point lower yield because the market is virtually certain
that he can deliver cash in five days at the maturity of thepaper.
He expects to pay for this two basis point reduction in the form of
the cost of reserves. Prior to maturity,the buyer must be
compensated for the possibility that he might have to sell to a
dealer who must finance inventory with a bank loan.For this, the
buyer must receive an 8 basis point higher interest rate, compared
to Fed funds. The issuer pays 4/5 of the cost (the higher interest
rate paid to the buyer), and the buyer pays 1/5 of the cost of
constantly providing liquidity to the CP.
The expected cost of reserves can take the form of an up front
fee for a line or a premium over the overnight inter-bank rate.If
the cost is paid as a fee, both issuers and purchasers of CP pay
the expected price for bank line use.If it is paid as a premium,
the full cost is borne by the actual users of lines, i.e. either by
the issuer or by the buyer of the paper in costs passed through the
dealer.
225. Who Pays the Cost of Reserves on CD's?The Market for less
Liquid Securities
In section 4 we described a liquidity problem in which the
marginal investor wanted to convert his CP or CD into a demand
deposit.We now consider less severe liquidity problems that may
affect less liquid financial instruments than CD's and CP's.We
will refer to the more severe crisis in which only demand deposits
are acceptable as a DD crisis and to the less severe liquidity
problemasaCD/CP crisis. Duringsuchliquidity problems,
investorsattempttoconverttheirlessliquidfinancial
instruments into CD's or CP's.In this milder formofliquidity
problem, CP and CD holders do not demand to convert their holdings
into demand deposits.
We assume, as before, that the Fed funds rate is 10 percent
and that banks hold a10 percent reserve ratio against demand
deposits.In addition, we assume that the reserve ratio on bank
CD'S is 3 percent and that the less liquid security has the same
five day maturity as the CPin our previous example)7 The
probability of a CD/CP liquidity crisis on any day is 0.2.The
probability of a DD liquidity crisis on any day is 0.1, as before.
The occurrence of the two types of crisis is mutually exclusive.
How does the cost of liquidity affect the market for the less
liquid instrument?At maturity, the issuer of the less liquid
instrument faces aprobability of 3/10 that he cannot roll over
17This ratio would reflect the CD'S effect on the bank's
potential net due to's from a day's transactions.
23his security and must fund witha bank loan.When this happens,
the bank can fund the loan with a CD with probability2/3; with a
probability of 1/3, it must issue a demand deposit.
By taking out a bank line to guarantee deliveryof whichever
bank deposit is demanded in settlement, theissuer faces part of
the expected cost for reserves generated bythe security.This
expected cost consists of two components: 1/5x 30 basis points is
the expected cost of a mild liquidity problemand 1/10 x 100 basis
points is the expected cost ofa major liquidity crisis.The total
expected cost of bank liquidity is then 1/5x 30 +1/10x 100 or 16
basis points.Since he refunds his security onceevery five days,
the issuer's expected cost in terms ofan annualized liquidity
premium is 1/5 x 16 or 3.2 basis points.He is willing to issue a
security backed by a line if hecan achieve a3.2 basis point
reduction in interest expense for doingso.
The holder of the security faces an expected cost ofreserves
in selling to a dealer in a crisis.In a mild crisis, the dealer
funds with a bank loan issued againsta CD.The cost is 1/5 x 30.
In a severe crisis, the bank loan is funded witha demand deposit.
The cost is1/10 x100.The total expected costis absorbed
between issuance and maturity-—thatis,for four out of five
days.Thus, the expected cost of reserves borne by the holder is
4/5 x 16 basis points or 12.8 basis points.The holder must be
paid 12.8 basis points over the Fed fundsrate to be content to
hold the less liquid security.
The cost of reserves on CD's will be split between the issuer
24of a security less liquid than a CD and the holder of the security.
The expected cost of reserves on a CD is1/5x30 or6basis
points.The holder pays an expected 1.2 basis points in terms of
accepting a lower yield than on the same security without a bank
line.The issuer pays an expected 4.8 basis points in terms of a
higher yield to compensate the investor for the cost of selling in
a mild crisis.
6. The Commercial and Industrial Loan Market
Consider a potential issuer whose security is so illiquid that
if it were sold on a security market, a dealer would always have to
fund his purchase with a bank loan.The security is also so
illiquid that it certainly cannot be rolled over at maturity--a
bank loan is surely required to deliver cash at maturity.We shall
show that the potential holder and issuer of this security face an
expected cost of reserves equal to the actual cost of reserves
against such a security held directly by a bank.No incentive then
arises to hold this security off a bank balance sheet.
Suppose that the Fed funds rate is 10 percent, the reserve
ratio on a demand deposit is 10 percent, and the reserve ratioon
a CD is 3 percent.For now we assume that the security is held by
a non-bank lender, that it matures in five days, and that it is
affected by a DD crisis in the same way as all other securities.
Withprobability .1,investorswillattempttosellthese
securities for demand deposits before maturityor the issuer will
have to deliver demand deposits at maturity. The C&Iloan,
25however, is in a constant state of mild liquiditycrisis.If an
investor were to sell the security,it would always have to be
bought by a dealer funded by CD, except in a DD crisis.Similarly,
issuers must always borrow from a bank at maturityfunded by CD
except in a DD crisis.
When he takes out a bank line, the issuer knows hemust borrow
at maturity.His expected cost of reserves is 1/10x 100 basis
points to cover the expected cost of delivery of demanddeposits.
It is 9/10 x 30 basis points to cover the expected cost of delivery
of a CD.Since the security matures every five days, his expected
cost of reserves is 1/5 x 1/10 x 100 basis points plus 1/5x 9/10
x 30 basis points7.4 basis points.He will take out a bank line
if he can issue his security for 7.4 basis points less than he
would have had he not obtained a bank line.
The holderofthesecurity mustbecompensatedforthe
expected dealer financing costs.These costs are 1/10 x 100 basis
points for the expected cost of the delivery of a demand deposit,
and 9/10 x 30 basis points for the expected cost of the delivery of
the CD.The holder faces these costs over 4 days.Thus, his total
expected cost is 4/5 x 1/10 x 100 basis points plus 4/5 x 9/10 x 30
basis points =29.6basis points.The holder will hold this
security only if he can earn 29.6 basis points above the Fed funds
rate.
The total expected cost of reserves is 37 basis points.Given
the market's expectation of liquidity crises, a bank can expect to
fund itself with 90 percent CD's and 10 percent demand deposits.
26The expected cost of the reserve burden facing the bank is thus .9
x 30 basis points plus .1 x 100 basis points =37basis points.
The expected cost of reserves in the C&I market exactly equals the
cost of reserves facing thebank.18
7.The Fed Funds Market and the Burden of Reserves
We have used the Fed funds rate as our benchmark liquid
interest rate.Fed funds obligations are effectively guaranteed
settlement in good funds since the Fed provides intra-day and
limited overnight lines to Fed fund borrowers.The properties of
bank demand deposits held overnight are identical to those of Fed
funds: both represent instant next—morning access to good funds.
As in Famas examples of the close substitutes CD and CP, the yield
on Fed funds should then approximate the implicit yield on demand
deposits.Yet, a bank funding itself with demand deposits bears a
reserve requirement while a bank funding itself with Fed funds does
not.Since a bank borrowing Fed funds typically must acquire them
from a bank which funds itself with demand deposits or with CD
which require reserves,itis conventionally presumed that Fed
funds yields bear a markup over implicit demand deposit yields and
CD yields by the cost of reserves.We will now show that, on the
contrary, the Fed funds and effective yields on demand deposit
18We note that lender and borrower share the burden of
reservesin the ratio of4to1,whichis determined by the
maturity characteristics of the note.In a more complete model,
the maturity characteristics would be endogenously determined.If
borrowers bore the burden of more frequent cash verification,
lenders would pay a higher percentage of the reserve burden.
27rates should be equal and, that both rates should be lower than
yields on CD and CP.
A Conventional View of the Relation Between Fed Funds and CD Rates
This conclusion is contrary to the following standard argument
that the Fed funds rate should equal the CD rate plus the interest
cost of reserves.-9At settlement,a bank with a net due to
position cumulated during the day has two means of acquiring funds
through raising liabilities.It can either purchase Fed funds or
sell a deposit.We presume that CD rates are the marginal cost of
bank funds.2°If it sells a CD,it creates a due from the bank
of the party purchasing the CD, which will decrease the selling
bank's own end—of—day net due to position.If it purchases Fed
funds,it settles a due to position directly through interbank
transactions alone.Either transaction will increase the bank's
reserve account balance.
Reserves must be held against CD, however, while no reserves
are required against Fed funds. Since banks would apparently gain
by avoiding the cost of reserves, banks should have an incentive to
bid the Fed funds rate above the CD rate by the cost of reserve
requirements.The effective CD rate, the CD rate divided by .97,
would equal the Fed funds rate.
That this does not happen is illustrated in Table3. We
compare the average daily Fed funds rate with the average daily one
19For example, see Moore et al.(1988).
20The argument would apply to implicit DD rates if DD is the
marginal source of funds.The Fed funds rate would then exceed the
DD rate by the cost of reserves.
28month domestic CD rate over the period 1980 through 1988.Over the
entire period, the Fed funds rate was an average of 13 basis points
above the CD rate.Correcting for reserve requirements by dividing
the CD rate by .97, the effective CD rate was 18 basis points above
the Fed funds rate.
CD's are of a longer maturity than overnight Fed funds,so
their yields are not strictly comparable.Since the positive
spread of Fed funds over CD's could have reflected an anticipation
of the dramatic decline in Fed funds rates over the period, we
investigated the spread for two sub—periods as well.Over the
three year period from the beginning of 1984 to year-end 1986, Fed
funds rates trended downward, but the decline was slow.During
that period, the Fed funds rate exceeded the CD rate (unadjusted
for reserve requirements) by 12 basi points.Adjusted for reserve
requirements, the CD rate exceeded the Fed funds rate by 14basis
points.Over the two year period from the beginning of 1987 to
year-end1988,theFedfunds rate was rising. TheCDrate
(unadjusted for reserves) exceeded the Fed funds rate by 7 basis
points, on average.In no case was the differential significantly
different from zero.
Why Demand Deposits and Fed Funds are Substitutes
In Table 4a we present the balance sheet of a bank at the end
of the business day.There are 1000 in demand deposits, 2000 in CD
and 50 in capital funding 950 of overnight Fed funds loans and 1940
of securities.Reserves are 160, 10% against DD and 3% against CD.
Since the business day is over, the customer with demand deposits
29has certain access to the funds at thestart of business thenext
day but has loaned the funds to the bankovernight.The bank then
has good funds overnight whichitcanlend atthe Fedfunds
rate.21
If it uses the deposit to lend Fed funds,good funds will be
returned by the borrowing bank at the startof business next day.
Hence, the properties of the Fed funds loanare identical to those
of the booked demand deposit.Table 4 depicts the balance sheet at
the start of business next day.Reserves have increased to 1110as
the Fed funds are repaid inunediately.
The bank would not pay a higher implicit yieldon demand
deposits than on Fedfunds.The demand deposits onits books
indicate that customers and the bank bothare willing to forego the
interest on the 10% requiredreserves held against the deposits.
Why do banks not bid the Fed funds rate above theDD rate by the
cost of holding reserves?
The DD holder has indirect access to the Fed funds market
through the use of overnight repurchase agreements with banks.
Toward the end of a business day,a customer faced with holding
positive end—of—day demand depositscan elect either to leave them
in the bank or to enter a repurchase agreement with the bank.In
a repurchase agreement, the customer will purchase a government
security from the bank at the end of the day, and the bank will buy
it back the next morning for a predetermined price.The bank's end
21Alternatively, having the demand deposit allows the bank
to avoid borrowing overnight Fed funds.
30ofday balance sheet willhavefewer demand deposits by the
purchase price of the security, and this will release reserves to
lend on the Fed funds market overnight.The next morning, the bank
simultaneously receives repayment on the Fed funds and repurchases
the security, making the funds available to the customer at the
start of business.
Table 5a depicts the end—of—day bank balance sheet if demand
deposits areall expended onarepurchase agreement. Demand
deposits are now zero, so reserves are only 60.The bank makes an
additional 100 in overnight Fed funds loans.A 1000 repurchase
liability replaces the demand deposit.Table 5b depicts the start
of day bank balance sheet after the Fed funds overnight loans have
been repaid on Fedwire and after the bank exchangesa demand
deposit credit for its securities to its repo customer.For the
bank and for the customer, the start of day position is identical
to that of holding a demand deposit overnight.
The repurchase agreement permits the customer to convert its
demand deposit into a collateralized Fed funds loan with liquidity
properties identical to Fed funds.22Both demand deposits and
repurchases entail delivery of good funds at the end of the day to
the bank for resale on the Fed funds market.Both require the
receipt of funds available for expenditure the next morning.From
22Since the repurchase agreement is collateralized while Fed
funds are not explicitly guaranteed, repurchaseagreement rates are
typically somewhat lower than the Fed funds rate.To ease clerical
problems and transactions costs, however, banks typicallyask that
the security be deposited with the bank itself.The extent of the
guarantee of repayment therefore is questionable.
31the viewpoint of the customer, theseare identical claims.If the
implicit yield on DD is less than the Fed fundsrate, the customer
will substitute entirely into repurchaseagreements, leaving no
demand deposits in the bank.
This discussion leads to a result analogousto the incidence
of the cost of reserves on CD and CP.Banks cannot charge the
reserve cost of demand deposits to the Fed funds borrowersor to
the holders of demand deposits.Demand deposits and Fed funds pay
the same liquidity premium because they have thesame liquidity
characteristics.
CD Rates and Fed Funds Rates
Since CD is less liquid than demand deposits, it shouldpay a
premiumto its holders over the implicit rate on demand deposits,
reflecting the costs of reserves held on demand deposits.Since
Fed funds are substitutes for demand deposits, CD rates beara
markup over Fed funds rates.
8. Reserves Are the Most Liquid Asset
Theavailabilityofsubstitutesforreservabledeposits
permits banks to reduce reserves to any desired level while still
supplying liquid liabilities to the market.23Since banks issue
demand deposits, they must not view reserves as a cost from which
they derive no benefit.They hold the level of reserves necessary
to supply liquidity to the market.We now consider why banks
choose both the amount of reserves that they will hold and their
23Reserves pushed out of the banks would show upas
increased currency holdings.
32structure of reservable liabilities.
Clearinghouses allow banks to conserveonthe holding of
reserves,thereby lowering the cost of delivering goodfunds.
Settlement,however,isdesignedtotransferriskfromthe
clearinghousebacktotheindividualmembers,severally.
Settlement occurs because ofarisk of material change in the
creditworthiness of banks.If a member's position deteriorates
such that it cannot deliver reserves for settlement of the day's
paymentorders,theentireclearinghouselosesthereserves
necessary to cover that bank's net due to position, which could
weaken otherwise strong members of the clearinghouse.
To assure that bank deposits are liquid instruments, periodic
settlements must occur.Risk transfer cannot be accomplished
completely unless reserves are held in the system.Reserves are
the most liquid instrument,whose presence makes credible the
guarantee of liquidity to other securities.24
The Federal Reserve absolutely guarantees delivery of reserves
associated with daylight payments, which lays the risk of non—
24This basic interpretation of reserves was held in the
early days of the Federal Reserve system.For example, Willis,
Chapman,and Robey(1933,p.257)state:"Thus,thereserve
requirement under the Federal Reserve Act is really that there be
maintained a net balance between claims upon the banks and those
held by it against other banks equal to a given percentage of the
claims (deposits)it has agreed to pay, and this balance is the
outcome of the clearing which has been described.It represents
the net live credit of the banks which make up the Federal Reserve
System--the credit which has not become subject to draft as the
result of checking by depositors.Reserves in the Federal Reserve
sense are thus the proportion of unquestionably liquid claims to
total outstanding claims against the members.The Federal Reserve
System is thus,in its reserve aspect,a means of testing and
assigning credit to those entitled to it."
33settlement on the Fed.If, in addition, they can borrowovernight
from the Fed to cover net due to positions, memberbanks themselves
havenoapparentincentivetoholdreservestoeffectrisk
transfer.To provide an incentive and to compensate itselffor the
risk it bears, the Fed must limit theuse of its overnight loans.
The Fed's limit creates a shadow price for borrowingreserves
from the Fed, which leads to a contract market in Fedfunds lines.
ToavoidincurringtheshadowpriceattheFed, abank
participating in the market will pay for Fed funds lines.25
On any day, a spot seller of Fed funds can apparently provide
funds on a line without holding reserves overnight becausethe Fed
guarantees thataliquidity problem on the next day willnot
prevent the delivery of good funds sent the following morning.
This appearance is an illusion, however.To assure the ability of
satisfying unusual borrowing demands on lines, the seller must hold
some overnight reserves.
As an example, assume that a spot seller of overnight Fed
funds arranges several Fed funds lines.Suppose that today it
sells allits reserve holdings on the spot market through its
committed lines by eliminating all its required reserves through
repos with its demand deposit customers. Thisisits normal
practice, so that it never holds reserves on its overnight balance
25If end—of-day net due to's are the random variable N, the
level of bank Fed funds lines, L, plus borrowings from the Fed, B,
must be such that N=L+B.If the lines pay the Fed funds rate
and the Fed's shadow overnight rate is r5(B), the banks establis
lines such that the difference between the expected Fed funds rate
and the shadow overnight rate equals the covariance between the
marginal shadow rate and the level of discount window borrowing.
34sheet.It appears that the cost of making credible the promise to
deliver good funds on the line commitments is zero exactly because
the Fed guarantees to deliver good funds for all payment orders
sent next day.Next morning, its Fed funds customers will deliver
the good funds due the seller, which will surely be available
because of the Fed's guarantee of Fedwire paymentsIf, next day,
its Fed funds line customers wish to increase their borrowing
demands under the. line to a level higher than normal, the selling
bank has no way to fulfill its obligations.To provide a credible
guarantee that yet additional Fed funds will be delivered on a
line, the seller must hold reserves overnight on its balance sheet;
and it will demand compensation for holding them.
9.A Crisis under a Fractional Reserve Banking System
Inourstylizedversionofthecommercialpaper market
presented in section 3, banks held reserves against lines.We have
argued that, in practice, they need not hold 100% reserves against
all lines because they are part of a banking system which can
mobilize goodfundsrapidly. Thus,the banking systemisa
fractional reserve system as measured against the potential demand
for reserves to back up lines.
Occasionally, however, there is an increase in the amount of
end—of—day net due to's in the banking system, withan associated
increase in demand for reserves.How does the system create the
increased delivery that is demanded?
The amount of reserves that the banking system chooses to hold
35is determined by the shadow price of borrowing fromthe Fed.With
a sudden increase in demand for reserves, sellers conunittedto Fed
funds lines can respond by substituting for demanddeposits non—
reservableliabilitieswithequalliquidity. Theycanalso
generate excess reserves by substituting non—reservablepaper for
CD's, though this is not as instantaneousa procedure.
If these actions cannot satisfy the demand, the Fedfunds rate
will rise.This will cause the liquidity premiumon less liquid
securities to rise andincrease the discount that sellersof
securities must suffer to effect settlement in demanddeposits.
Some potential sellers will decide to hold their securities rather
than to sell them for bank deposits.In addition, the Fed funds
rate may rise sufficiently to make it profitable to pay the shadow
price of borrowing from the Fed, which will increase the amount of
reserves in the system.
Finally, the Fed may provide liquidity to the market through
open market operations.If the Fed makes it known that it will
substantially increase reservesinacrisis,bank holding of
reserves will decline in normal times.
10. When are Reserve Requirements a Tax?
Reserverequirements associated with theoccasionalbank
funding of securities are paid by both issuers and investors.If
reserves really areatax,the burdenisthen borne byall
participantsinthesecuritiesmarkets,includingnon-bank
intermediaries. In this section,we analyze the question of
36whether reserves are indeed a tax on the provision of liquidity.
Reserve requirements cannot be a tax if banks would hold the
samelevelofreserves withouttherequirement. Ifperfect
substitutes are available for reservable deposits, banks can reduce
the levelof reserves to the desired level regardless of the
reserve requirement.
If the clearinghouse or Federal Reserve decides to increase
reserve requirements onDD,the cost of settlementin demand
deposits increases, which raises liquidity premiums on CP and CD.
Fewer transactions will be settled in bank deposits and more open
market paper will be issued relative to bank loans.The rise in
liquidity premiums will be constrained somewhat by the decline in
the probability ofa demand for settlement in demand deposits
because of the increased cost of such settlement.
The reserve requirement is a crucial determinant of the size
of the banking system as measured by the end—of—day balance sheet
and of the liquidity premium.If the requirement is high, the
liquidity premium and the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets
will be high.But in what sense is the reserve requirement high?
To determine this, we return to our discussion of the private
clearinghouse.
The Optimal Level of Reserves at the Private Clearinghouse
Reserves must at least equal the sum of the end—of—day net due
to positions for the private clearinghouseto guarantee absolutely
the delivery of goodfundsatsettlement. The costofthe
37guarantee is the foregone interest on the reserves; andto receive
the assurance that good funds can be deliveredon the day's payment
orders, clearing members pay this cost of providing theguarantee.
Reserves are not a tax in this situation.26
Reserves become a tax when a clearinghouse forces itsmembers
to hold reserves in excess of those reasonablyneeded to cover the
day's "net due to's".If excessive reserves are required,the
price of delivery of funds will rise,forcing up the liquidity
premium on yields on market securities.More investors will be
willing to forego selling their securities to dealersfor bank
deposits, because the price of dealer bank finance will rise.
Are Reserves a Tax in the Federal Reserve System?
What is the appropriate level of reserve requirements in the
Federal Reserve System?The Fed's guarantee ofdeliveryof
reserves at settlement is absolute.Ideally, the Fed should set
the reserve requirement such that the income on its portfolio of
securities financed by reserves plus income from other chargeson
member banks for using the payments system covers expected losses
from the payments system.
The Fed can mimic the private clearinghouse in this regard.
It can set reserves equal to expected end-of—day net due to's and
charge a fee for expected losses in reserves.Required reserves in
26 Members of the clearinghouse must bear an additional
chargein the event that one of their membersfails,so the
interest foregone on the reserves does not represent the total cost
of the guarantee.Members must assess depositors an additional
charge to cover the expectation that they will have to replace
reserves.
38the United States are currently about $59 billion, of which about
$37 billion represents bank deposits held at the Fed. An additional
$22 billion is vault cash held directly at banks for use in the
banks' currency business.Net due to positions on Fedwire, CHIPS,
and U.S. government securities trading suxn to about $100 billion
a day at some time of the day.Total reserves are then less than
the potential due to position during the day, though not at the end
of the day.This is below the level that a private clearinghouse
would set to provide an absolute payment guarantee.27
Reserve requirements are not necessarily too low, however.
Unliketheprivateclearinghouse,theFedearnsintereston
reserves.Since it can create good funds at will, itcan invest
the proceeds without worrying about its ability to convert themto
good funds to satisfy net due to positions.This income can be
viewed as compensation for having to supply additionalreserves in
the event that an individual bank or group of bankscannot deliver
good funds at settlement.The private clearinghouse would have to
assess individual members in the event of a failure.The Fed would
absorb the loss on daylight overdrafts since itwould have to line
up as an unsecured creditor.
In summary, reserve requirements cannot bea tax on banks
because with perfect substitutes forreservable deposits banks can
avoid holding unwantedreserves.In the U.S., bank reserves amount
27The net due to position in thegovernment securities market
is $40 billion.If a bank fails to make paymenton a government
security it has received for itscustomer, and the Fed delivers
reserves as payment to the seller'sbank, it is not clear who has
claim to the security-—thepurchaser or the Fed.
39to about2percent of bank liabilities while depositsat the
Federal Reserve amount to about 1 percent of liabilities.This is
comparable to reserves held against liabilities inother banking
systems with much lower reserve requirements.Counting off—balance
sheet items,itis comparable to the reserves heldby the UK
banking system, which lacks explicitreserve requirements.
11. Conclusion
In the conventional view, reserve requirementsare a tax on
the banking system not borne by other intermediaries.The recent
literature has focused on bank borrowersas the bearers of the cost
ofreserves. Thishasresultedpartlyfromevidencethat
commercial paper and certificates of deposit tradeat the same
yields.Commercial paper is not subject to a reserve requirement,
while certificates of deposit are.Since they trade at the same
yield,certificate of deposit holders cannot bear the cost of
reserves.Therefore, bank borrowers must.
We have presented an alternative for how the cost ofreserves
is borne in financial markets.Commercial paper issuers purchase
lines which commit a bank to provide a loan if the issuer cannot
roll over the paper at maturity.The bank guarantees that a
commercial paper issuer can deliver good funds to the investor at
maturity, so the bank supplies liquidity to the commercialpaper
market.
We have shown that commercial paper issuers pay for reserve
requirements to the extent that they expect to borrow against their
lines because the use of the line has payment implications for the
40banking system, which expands its desire to hold reserves.Using
a similar line of argument, we have shown that the cost of reserves
must be reflected in the prices of all securities.
Securities with a bank line trade at lower interest rates than
securities with otherwise identical characteristics which lack a
line.The difference in yields exactly reflects the expected cost
of reserves and represents a liquidity premium.
If a security without a bank line has a low probability of
requiring settlement by the delivery of good funds, the expected
cost of a bank line and the liquidity premium will be very low.We
can then define a liquid security as a security which infrequently
settles with the delivery of reservable deposits.Consequently,
holders and issuers of these securities pay little of the cost of
reserves.
Reserve requirements are not a tax if close subs it jtutes exist
for reservable liabilities.Even without such substitutes, if they
are set at the level necessary to guarantee that a banking system
can provide settlementingoodfundsattheendofaday's
transactions, they also need not represent a tax.If they are set
above this limit,they areatax;the incidence ofthe tax,
however,falls generally on liquidity in all financial markets
rather than on current depositors or borrowers from the banking
system.The cost of reserves cannot be a tax on liquidity as long
asthemarketcancreateinstrumentswhichhavenoreserve
requirements while maintaining the same liquidity as reservable
deposits.
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One Month CD Rate Less Federal Funds Rate
Reserve Adlusted Unadjusted
198 0—88
Average Difference 0.18% —0.13%
Stand. Dev. 0.70% 0.70%
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End of Day—Hold DD Fed Funds Pays Off
Assets Uabihtles Assets Uabilitles
Reseives 160 1000 00 Res.ree 1110 1000 00
Fed Funds 950 2000 CD Securitiee 1940 2000 CD
Securities 1940 50 Capital 50 Capital
Table 5
(a) (b)
End of Day—Use AP Next Morning
Fed Funds Pays Off
Assets Uabilltles Assets Uabilities
Reserves 60 1Q00 Repo Reserves 1110 1000 00
Fed Funds 1050 2000 CD Securities 1940 2000 CD
Securities 1940 50 Capital 50 Capital